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Abstract  
This paper investigates the influences of CSR disclosure on firm's agency cost and 
performance using agency theory perspective. Analysing the sample of 437 US large firms 
from 2010 to 2011 with the two-stage least square instrument variable estimation approach, 
we found that CSR disclosure does not statistically associate with agency cost which was 
measured by the asset utilisation ratio. CSR disclosure significantly improves firm financial 
performance in term of both return on asset and return on equity ratio but it does not affect 
sale performance which is measured by revenue growth. The study results indicate that CSR 
communication could be an effective tool for efficiency improvement in upstream supply 
chain activities and thereby enhance firm financial performance but not a fruitful tool for 
such downstream activities as marketing and sale. The study offers an insight that CSR 
should be seen as an investment rather than a cost to the firm.  




The last two decades witnessed a growing attention of both academia and practitioners to 
corporate social responsibility (CSR). Following the issuance of ISO 26000 on CSR in 2010, 
most big corporations have prepared annual reports of their CSR practices, voluntarily 
disclosing their environmental, social and governance information. As corporate 
responsibilities have increasingly expanded due to heightened stakeholder expectations in a 
globalized economy, the way in which organizations communicate with their stakeholders 
through CSR communication has become a subject of intense scrutiny (Crane and Glozer, 
2016). In many firms, CEOs make most of the decisions including the ones related to CSR 
and corporate image (Li et al., 2016). Risi and Wickert's (2017) empirical findings suggest 
that CSR managers have an important yet ambiguous role to play in the CSR implementation 
process. This has ignited the debate among scholars about how and why CSR engagement 
affects firm performance or it is an agency cost enjoyed by managers at the expense of 
shareholders. Despite a large amount of literature exploring the relationship between CSR 
engagement and firm performance, a fundamental question "Does CSR really benefit a 
company or is it an agency cost?" remains unanswered (Li et al., 2016; Hong et al., 2016).  
To fill this gap, our paper examines the effect of firm’s CSR disclosure on firm's agency cost 
and performance; these are firm’s product market performance reflected by sales growth and 
firm’s financial performance measured by return on assets (ROA) and return on equity 
(ROE). Using the data of the US large firms from 2010 to 2011, we found that CSR 
disclosure is neither related to firm’s agency cost nor significantly effective on sales growth; 
however, CSR disclosure is significantly and positively associated with firm’s financial 
performance.  
Our paper provides three theoretical contributions. First, we contribute to the theoretical 
debate about the costs and benefits of CSR engagement by providing evidence of positive 
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effect of CSR disclosure on firm's financial performance while we suggest that CSR 
engagement is not an agency cost for shareholders. Second, we extend the debate on how 
firms should communicate about their social responsibility initiatives (Lindgreen and Swaen, 
2009) to the public by providing empirical evidence to support the view that disclosing CSR 
information is an investment to the disclosing organisations. Third, to our best knowledge, 
this study is the first that has investigated the influence of CSR disclosure on agency cost. We 
used the Google Scholar to search for previous studies that look into the effect of CSR 
disclosure on agency cost; nevertheless, we could not find any. Furthermore, in the latest and 
comprehensive review of the literature in the field of CSR communication, Crane and 
Glozer's (2016) findings indicate no existing literature has investigated the influence of CSR 
disclosure on agency cost.  
The remaining sections of the paper are the literature review and development of the 
hypotheses, the research method, the empirical results and interpretations. The last section 
concludes the paper and suggests the avenue for future research.  
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES  
Agency Cost  
Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) posits the notion that the separation of 
ownership and control potentially leads to self-interested actions taken by agents since people 
are rooted in economic rationality. It is argued that in situations in which there is an interest 
conflict between the agent and principal, the former is likely to select self-serving actions at 
the cost of the latter’s welfare (Deutsch, 2005). The main issues come from the information 
asymmetry and interest deviations between the agent and principal.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) view an agency relationship as a contract under which the 
principal engages the agent to perform some service on their behalf, which involves 
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delegating the authority of decision making to the agent. Three fundamental behavioural 
assumptions about the agent and the principal in agency theory are: both of them are (a) 
rational and (b) self-interested, whereas the former is (c) more risk-averse than the latter 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The agent typically possesses more or better information than the 
principal on the decision-making situations, or on the consequences of actions (Ross, 1973). 
The information asymmetry results in the agency cost of dealing with the principal-agent 
relationship.  
As a person has the propensity to be opportunistic (Cyert and March, 1963), an interest 
conflict may arise between the agent and principal; consequently, moral hazard (Akerlof, 
1970) may harm the principal. Moral hazard is the concept of unobservable dishonest 
behaviour, lack of transparency, irresponsibility and undue diligence of one party at the 
other’s expense after the contract has been signed. The essential thing is how to match the 
interests and goals of the agent and the principal in order that both have benefits and gains.  
Moral hazard can be controlled through monitoring and bonding, although there are 
inevitably residual costs in agency relationships. Thus agency cost control mechanisms are 
the processes, systems, and structures designed and set up for purpose of monitoring and 
alignment of interests between managers and firm owners. These agency cost and control 
mechanisms apply to all sources of agency problems (Chrisman et al., 2004).  
Most literature on agency cost is conceptual work. Only a handful of studies attempt to 
empirically examine agency cost. These studies popularly examine agency cost in the 
relations with the corporate governance structure. Ang et al. (2000) used a sample of the US 
small firms to test the hypotheses on the link between ownership structure and agency cost. 
While a few papers (McConaughy et al., 2001; Chrisman et al., 2004; Fleming et al., 2005) 
use the measure of agency cost adopted from Ang et al. (2000) for study of small firms, little 
is known about it in studying big companies except two papers using the data of the US large 
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firms (see Singh and Davidson III, 2003; Jurkus et al., 2011) and another study using a 
dataset of the UK large firms (see McKnight and Weir, 2009). Recently, Rashid (2015) 
empirically investigates the relations between board independence, board size, CEO duality 
and agency cost. Similarly, Rashid (2016) empirically examines the link between managerial 
ownership and agency cost. However, there is no research investigating the agency cost in the 
relation with CSR. In this paper, we will look into how and why disclosure of CSR 
information influences agency cost and whether this voluntary disclosure contributes towards 
to firm’s performance.  
 
CSR disclosure and agency cost  
While CSR definitions vary, it generally refers to actions taken by companies with respect to 
their employees, communities, and the environment that goes beyond what is legally required 
of a company (Barnea and Rubin, 2010). Based on Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency 
theory, Barnea and Rubin (2010) see CSR engagement as a principal-agent relation between 
managers and shareholders, and argue that managers have an interest in over-investing in 
CSR in order to obtain private gains of building reputation as good social citizens, possibly at 
an expense to firm owners. On the other hand, Jo and Harjoto (2011) provide evidence 
supporting the opposite view which states that top management engages in CSR to resolve 
the conflicts among various stakeholders. Despite the ongoing debate among scholars and 
practitioners regarding these two competing hypotheses, few definitive conclusions can be 
drawn and the literature remains divided (see Griffin and Mahon, 1997; Orlitzky et al., 2003; 
Margolis et al., 2009).  
The impact of modern economic activities on quality of life has caused growing stakeholders’ 
concerns about environmental and social issues (Raelin and Bondy, 2013). Stakeholder 
management model (Freeman, 1984) requires the management to pay attention to the 
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legitimate interests of stakeholders, implicitly and explicitly, both in the establishment of 
corporate structures and policies and in daily decision making. Stakeholder theorists frame 
the idea that voluntary disclosure narrows the information asymmetry gap between a firm and 
its investors. Moreover, businesses are bound by a social contract in which they perform 
socially-desirable actions to seek for approval about their objectives and other rewards, which 
ultimately guarantee their continued existence (Suchman, 1995). By disclosing CSR 
information, a firm can signal their accountability and transparency to shareholders and 
stakeholders alike, hence more legitimacy and sustainability. These help the firm lessen 
agency cost.  
It is necessary for CEOs to make effort to facilitate the proper counselling and monitoring 
functions of the directorate system by disseminating information in a timely and appropriate 
manner to all concerned. While a CEO has a chance to prioritize the fulfilment of legal 
contracts with firm owners rather than social contracts by passing costs on to society (Raelin 
and Bondy, 2013), agency theory suggests this chance is reduced when there is more 
monitoring over the CEO from a board. To facilitate the board monitoring process, 
shareholders can require the CEO to disclose non-financial information. This is because 
social and environmental resources are likely to be misused by the firm; both shareholders 
and stakeholders would then pay costs arising from this misuse.  
CSR disclosure aims towards a reduction of information asymmetry between managers and 
firm owner. CSR disclosure is defined as the communication of the governance, social and 
environmental impacts resulting from a firm’s economic actions on particular interest groups 
and on society at large (Gray et al., 1996). An agency problem occurs due to information 
asymmetry, CSR disclosure could mitigate agency cost. This leads to the following 
hypothesis:  




CSR disclosure and firm performance  
Among the most common measurements for firm performance are sale performance and 
financial performance. The effect of CSR on sale performance can be analysed by applying 
the conventional consumer decision making process model suggested by Nicosia (1966) to 
understand consumer behaviours toward CSR activities in their decision-making stages.  
In the need recognition stage, consumer awareness, knowledge and perception of CSR 
activities may serve as an added advantage for the company (Fatma and Rahman, 2015) and a 
pre-condition of its benefits, such as a positive response (Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001) and 
purchase intention (Lee and Shin, 2010). A low level of awareness does not result in positive 
response to those activities (Pomering and Dolnicar, 2009; Auger et al., 2003). Most of the 
previous studies have shown a positive perception of CSR in the developed nations and 
depicts that consumers are interested in and aware of CSR of producers and use them as a 
purchasing criterion (Arli and Lasmono, 2010).  
In the information search and evaluation stage, previous studies suggest a positive 
association between CSR activities and consumer attitudes toward the firm (Brown and 
Dacin, 1997; Creyer and Ross, 1997; Ellen et al., 2006). Generally, consumers have a 
positive attitude toward companies that engage in CSR activities (Fatma and Rahman, 2015).  
In the purchase stage, the influence of CSR on consumer purchase behaviour is more 
complicated and flexible, compared to its effect on their attitudes and beliefs (Sen and 
Bhattacharya, 2001). Consumers are not willing to compromise on the main attributes of a 
product, i.e. price and quality (Mohr and Webb, 2005; Gupta and Hodges, 2012). Consumers 
are more sensitive to “unethical” behaviours compared to “ethical” behaviours; this means 
that “doing bad” hurts more than “doing good” helps (Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001; Brown 
8 
 
and Dacin, 1997; Fatma and Rahman, 2015). Moreover, competition on product market 
fosters CSR adoption (Flammer, 2015).  
In post-purchase, CSR and perceived value have been shown to be important antecedents to 
customer satisfaction (Fornell, 1992, Smith, 2003; Carvalho et al., 2010). Customers tend to 
be more satisfied with firms that are socially responsible (Lee and Heo, 2009). Satisfied 
customers may result in loyalty (Bolton and Drew, 1991), a willingness to pay a higher price 
(Homburg et al., 2005) and positive word-of-mouth comments (Szymanski and Henard, 
2001). Previous empirical findings such as those provided by Lev et al. (2010); Harjoto and 
Jo (2011) support the positive influence of CSR disclosure on sales and/or sales growth.  
As such, CSR disclosure may entice consumers to buy a product or service. As a result, firms 
may reap a price premium or increase in market share and have good sale performance. Thus, 
we propose the following hypothesis:  
H2: CSR disclosure is positively associated with firm's sale performance.  
Apart from sale performance, there are other potential benefits to firm performance that a 
company has toward the CSR activities. First, CSR may help recruit, motivate, and retain 
good employees. For example, Timberland notes that its provision of paid time off for 
employees to volunteer for social causes helps to ‘‘attract and retain valuable talent’’ 
(Sprinkle and Maines, 2010). Murray (2007) claims that ‘‘people are seeking the meaning at 
work… and, it has become clear that staff motivation is a powerful bottom-line benefit of 
corporate responsibility’’. De Roeck et al.'s (2016) findings from a longitudinal study suggest 
the long-term impact of employees’ perceptions of CSR on their willingness to feel a stronger 
sense of belongingness to or oneness with their organization. Meanwhile, employee 
engagement is the key to improving firm performance (Kompaso and Sridevi, 2010).  
Second, companies’ focus on environmental issues can lead to reductions in production costs. 
For example, Wal-Mart reduced transportation costs by $3.5 million through an initiative to 
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reduce packaging on toys in 2006 while Ecology and Environment reported the efficiency 
gains resulting from these measures which accrued an estimated net savings of approximately 
$232,000 from 1999 to 2008 (Sprinkle and Maines, 2010). Earlier, McGuire et al. (1988) 
noted that there was a significant positive correlation between CSR and ROA; firms with 
positive CSR may find that they have more low-cost implicit claims than other firms. 
Therefore, investments in CSR have a big return in terms of financial results; the related 
benefits are found to be bigger than the related costs.  
Third, CSR also may reduce the possibility of untoward incidents occurring, which in turn 
reduces the likelihood of lawsuits and negative effect on the firm's reputation. CSR might 
help manage such risks by ensuring that reputable and sustainable business practices are 
being followed throughout the supply chain that might otherwise harm future profits of the 
firm (Sprinkle and Maines, 2010).  
Finally, firms engaging in CSR are more likely to attract capital from investors and receive 
more favourable terms from creditors because many individuals likely wish to align their 
investment dollars with their moral aims (Sprinkle and Maines, 2010). As such, CSR 
activities which are reflected by CSR disclosure enable a firm to create more output as a 
result from more engaged and talented workforce, to reduce production and supply chain risk 
cost and obtain more investment, thereby its financial performance will improve. Thus, we 
propose a hypothesis as followed:  
H3: CSR disclosure is positively associated with firm's financial performance.  
RESEARCH METHOD  
Empirical models  
To test our hypotheses, we developed two empirical models in which CSR disclosure is the 
key independent variable while either agency cost (proxied by assets utilisation ratio - AUR) 
or firm performance is the dependent variable. We controlled for the proportion of 
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independent directors, firm leverage, market value and the number of employees which are 
popularly used as control variables in corporate governance literature.  
Equation 1 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 it=β0+ β1(𝑐𝑠𝑟_𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒)it+β2(𝑖𝑛_𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟)it + β3(𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒)it+ 
β4(𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)it+ β5(𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒_𝑛𝑜)it +εit  
Equation 2 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 it=β0+ β1(𝑐𝑠𝑟_𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒)it+β2(𝑖𝑛_𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟)it + β3(𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒)it+ 
β4(𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)it+ β5(𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒_𝑛𝑜)it +εit  
Where  
Dependent variable:  
To measure agency cost, we used assets utilisation ratio (AUR) to proxy agency cost. Ang et 
al. (2000) was the first literature which has initiated the relative measure of agency cost for 
companies as AUR calculated by annual turnover divided by annual total assets of a firm. 
AUR demonstrates the efficiency of using a unit of company assets to generate sales, which 
reflects “the loss in revenues attributable to inefficient asset utilization, which can result from 
poor investment decisions or from management’s shirking (e.g., exerting too little effort to 
help generate revenue)”. AUR reflects the effectiveness of firm investment decisions and the 
ability of the management to direct assets to the most productive use. Firms with lower AUR 
are inferred making non-optimal investment decisions or using funds to purchase 
unproductive, i.e. non-revenue-generating assets, thereby creating agency cost for 
shareholders (Henry, 2010). AUR thereby indicates the quality of management since lower 
efficiency can also be viewed as a proxy for higher agency cost, other things being equal 
(McConaughy et al., 2001). AUR has also been widely used as a proxy for agency cost in 
other studies (Ang et al., 2000; Singh and Davidson III, 2003; Fleming et al., 2005; 
Florackis, 2008; McKnight and Weir, 2009; Rashid, 2015; Rashid, 2016).  
Underpinned by the Ang et al. (2000), our study employed AUR as the relative measure of 
agency cost although there are two more indicators which some studies also used to measure 
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agency cost. These are: (i) the expense ratio (ER) which is the ratio of operating expenses 
(selling, general, and administrative expenses, excluding financing expenses and any non-
recurring expenses, such as losses on the sale of assets) to total annual sales (see Ang et al. 
2000); (ii) the ‘Q-free cash flow interaction’ (Q*FCF) which is the interaction of company’s 
growth opportunities with its free cash flows (see Rashid, 2016). The reason for our use of 
AUR is because it is the more widely accepted as the proxy for agency cost in previous 
literature than the other two (see Rashid, 2015; 2016).  
To quantify firm performance, we used the absolute values of performance measures, such as 
profitability and sales growth (Chakravarthy, 1986; Cronin and Page, 1988; Greenley, 1995). 
Annual sales growth (sales_growth) was calculated by sales of a year divided by sales of the 
previous year. Similar to Rashid (2015) and Rashid (2016), we measured profitability with 
annual ROE and ROA. Although some studies (i.e Rashid, 2015; Rashid, 2016) used Tobin’s 
Q as a financial market performance measure, this indicator is not relevant to our study as we 
looked into the sales and accounting measures rather than financial market performance 
measures.  
Key independent variable:  
CSR disclosure (csr_disclose) is calculated on the amount of environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) information that a company disclosed. This score was measured by 
Proprietary Bloomberg ESG group and used in the previous studies such as Aragón-Correa et 
al. (2016) and Lai et al. (2016).  
ESG disclosure scores were measured in terms of the degree of transparency of a company’s 
reporting on ESG metrics (Lai et al., 2016). Although ESG disclosure scores are not 
specifically a performance metric, the scores demonstrate the degree to which a company 
reports non-financial information.  
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The scores range from 0.1 for companies that disclosed a minimum amount of data to 100 for 
those that disclosed every data point. Each data point is weighted in terms of importance, 
with environmental data carrying a greater weight than other disclosures in EGS, greenhouse 
gas emission carrying greater weight than other environmental disclosures in E, and 
workforce data carrying greater weight than other social disclosures in S. Companies that are 
not covered by the Proprietary Bloomberg ESG group and companies that do not disclose 
anything will have no score. The scores were also tailored to different industries; in this way, 
each company was evaluated in terms of the data relevant to its industrial sector.  
Control variable:  
We used four variables for control in which:  
We controlled the composition of directors (in_director) (Singh and Davidson III, 2003) or 
board independence in the other words (Rashid, 2015).  
Firm leverage (leverage) was controlled in the model (Ang et al., 2000; Singh and Davidson 
III, 2003; Henry, 2010). The use of debt financing is expected to have a positive incentive 
effect on firm managers and reduce agency costs due to the adverse consequences associated 
with defaulting on debt obligations. Consequently, banks require a strategic business plan 
before they lend money to firms. Debt finance provides an alternative and/or complementary 
control mechanism to managerial equity ownership and family ownership for reducing 
agency costs of a firm (Seetharaman et al., 2001).  
Firm size was proxied by market value (market_value) (Singh and Davidson III, 2003) and 
employee number (emp_nu).  
Instrument variable for the key explanatory variable:  
Environmental disclosure score (envi_disclose), social disclosure score (social_disclose) and 
governance disclosure score (gov_disclose) were used as the three instrument variables for 
csr_disclose in the regressions due to the fact that csr_disclose was compiled from 
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environmental, social and governance information a firm disclosed as described in 
Bloomberg.  
The variables and measures are presented in Table 1.  
(Insert Table 1 about here)  
Context  
To investigate the influences of CSR disclosure on firm's agency cost and performance, we 
decided to use the context of large firms from the US. The reason for choosing the US is that 
the US is often seen as being the paradigmatic case of the shareholder-oriented or market-
based model to corporate governance, and described in terms of several interrelated elements: 
activist institutional investors, an open market for corporate control, independent outside 
directors on the board, long-term equity-based compensation for executives, and gatekeepers 
who monitor the process of market disclosure (Jackson, 2010).  
The other reason for our usage of large firm data is attributed to Jensen and Meckling’s 
(1976) seminal paper hypothesizing that the more separation of ownership and control, i.e. in 
the situation the larger a firm becomes, the higher its agency costs incur due to the increased 
monitoring cost and bonding cost necessary for large firms. The further reason that we used 
large companies in the US for testing the hypotheses is that we aim to extend the Ang et al. 
(2000)’s work which rely on data of small American companies.  
All of the firms in the dataset are listed on the New York Stock Exchange. The most common 
industries in the dataset are electric, medical, bank, oil and gas, retail, manufacturing, food, 
financial and commercial service, insurance, aerospace, transportation, building and 
constructions, chemical and steel production.  
Data  
First, the names of the US leading firms were collected from the Fortune website released 
between March 2011 and March 2012. After that, we manually collect the ISIN code or a 
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Bloomberg ticker for each firm. We made sure that the dataset was narrowed down to the 
active public companies. Next, annual data on turnover, total assets, environmental disclosure 
score, social disclosure score, governance disclosure score and the combined environmental-
social-governance disclosure score (ESG), the percentage of independent directors on board, 
return on equity, return on assets, sales growth, debt-to-equity ratio, market value, number of 
employees and industry sectors from 2010 to 2011 were automatically collected from 
Bloomberg.  
The final dataset includes 726 firm-year observations from 437 US firms in 167 industry 
sectors as classified by Bloomberg. This is an unbalanced dataset. Due to the missing data for 
some of the variables, the number of observations used in the modelling was marginally 
reduced.  
Estimation Strategy  
Sensitivity analysis  
First, we checked multicollinearity problem by examining correlation coefficients among 
predictors and their Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). As shown in Table 2, all of the VIFs are 
smaller than 10, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a problem with our dataset (Mansfield 
& Helms, 1982).  
(Insert Table 2 about here)  
Second, we examined the potential endogeneity of our independent variable. This variable is 
endogenous when it is correlated with the error term of a model (Wooldridge, 2013) or when 
a loop of causality between the independent and dependent variables of a model exists (Jia 
and Skaperdas, 2012). We run the regressions on csr_disclose using AUR [sales_growth] 
[roe] [roa] alternatively as the independent variable. The P value obtained from the 
regression results is small (P < 0.05), so endogeneity is an issue in our models.  
Estimation method  
15 
 
To deal with the endogeneity problem of the predictor, we used Instrumental Variable Two-
Stage Least Square regression method as suggested by Wooldridge (2013). Social disclosure 
score (social_disclose) and Governance disclosure score (gov_disclose) were used as the 
instrument variables for csr_disclose in the regression on AUR (see Model 1 in Table 3).  
Environment disclosure score (envi_disclose), Social disclosure score (social_disclose), and 
Governance disclosure score (gov_disclose) were used as the instrument variables for 
csr_disclose in the regression on sales_growth [roe] [roa] (see Models 2, 3, 4 in Table 3).  
(Insert Table 3 about here)  
Robustness check  
To make sure that our findings are robust, we conducted several tests as suggested by 
Wooldridge (2013). The P value from the Wu-Hausman F test and Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-
sq test of endogeneity of csr_disclose (P=0.29 in Model 1; P=0.33 in Model 2; P=0.50 in 
Model 3; P=0.76 in Model 4) show that the hypothesis of exogenous regressor cannot be 
rejected. Thus, endogeneity issue of our models was addressed.  
The first-stage regression summary statistics demonstrate that P =0.00 on both of the models, 
thereby suggesting the instrument variables used are not weak.  
For the tests of overidentifying restrictions, both of the Sargan (score) chi2 and the Basmann 
chi2 have large P value (P=0.23 in Model 1; P=0.56 in Model 2; P=0.58 in Model 3; P=0.50 
in Model 4) indicating that the instrument variables used are valid. Thus, the estimation 
method and the results produced are robust.  
RESULTS  
The descriptive statistics of our dataset is presented in Table 2. The average size of a firm in 
our dataset is the one with 54,565 employees. The smallest has 230 staff while the biggest 
firm has 2,100,000 employees. The average CSR disclosure score is 26.48 percent. The 
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average value of sale growth is 9.96 percent while ROE and ROA are respectively 18.30 and 
6.15 percent on average.  
Table 3 displays the results obtained from 2SLS regression of Equations (1) and (2). As can 
be seen, CSR disclosure is not significantly associated with AUR; therefore, H1 is not 
confirmed. Similarly, CSR disclosure has no significant effect on sales growth; therefore, H2 
is not confirmed.  
However, H3 is confirmed at 99% confidence interval as the statistically significant and 
positive effect of CSR disclosure on ROA (p= 0.00; β=0.07). H3 is further confirmed at 90% 
significance level as our results show the statistically significant and positive effect of CSR 
disclosure on ROE (P=0.08; β=0.20).  
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DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION  
Hong et al. (2016) suggest that socially responsible activities of a firm are more likely to be 
beneficial to shareholders, as opposed to agency costs. However, the disclosure of CSR 
information at the same time might cause more divergent interests, thereby increasing agency 
problems and the consequent higher agency costs. There is a significant amount of literature 
suggesting firm’s social engagement as an inefficient use of resources. For example, the 
shareholder theory (Friedman, 1962) views CSR as an unnecessary cost of doing business. 
Accordingly, addressing social issues reduces firm profits and is akin to a transfer of benefits 
from shareholders to stakeholders. A similar argument is made, e.g., in Elhauge (2005) that, 
CSR policies involve “sacrificing corporate profits in the public interest”. Barnea and Rubin 
(2010) support the counter argument that disclosure of CSR information is likely to be green-
washing or corporate imaging, which are interest diversions to the shareholder value. Overall, 
more CSR disclosure for the purpose of building glossy image tends to incur more costs spent 
on stakeholders on the firm owner’s expenses, resulting in higher agency costs. Nevertheless, 
our test result demonstrating the statistically insignificant effect of CSR disclosure on assets 
utilization, proxied for agency cost, does not support these arguments.  
Although our result shows the statistically insignificant effect of CSR disclosure on sales 
growth, the negative sign presents a tendency for a negative association between CSR 
disclosure and sales growth, implying that consumers are, somewhat, sceptical about CSR 
activities of a firm. Firm's sale performance tends to decrease when the firm discloses more 
about its CSR activities. This is possible because consumers see the CSR activities which 
companies are engaging in as "window dressing" (Fatma and Rahman, 2015). In fact, Porter 
and Kramer (2006, p. 80) claim that “the most common corporate responses have been 
neither strategic nor operational but cosmetic”.  
18 
 
For financial performance, it is important to note that the CSR-financial performance 
relationship represents a proliferation of approaches which are controversial, complex and 
unclear (Garriga and Mele, 2004). Earlier, a mixture of positive and negative effects have 
been found in the relationship between CSR and profitability (Margolis and Walsh, 2003). 
Jones (2004) indicates that the difficulty in identifying and quantifying CSR lies in the fact 
that CSR involves not only spending but also the ethical behaviour of company management 
to the stakeholders. The relationship between CSR and financial performance is not easily 
determined; there are conceptual and practical problems to be resolved. The concept of CSR 
is still suffering from a shortage of strong theoretical foundations and empirical validity 
(Gond, 2008).Our results of the statistically significant effect of CSR disclosure on both ROE 
and ROA suggest that CSR disclosure directly contributes to better financial performance. 
Our findings are in line with Ekatah et al.'s (2011) study about the positive and statistically 
significant relationship between CSR and profitability of Royal Dutch Shell Plc, operating in 
more than 145 countries. Our results are also consistent with Flammer's (2015) findings that 
if a company reaches a certain level of CSR adoption, this leads to superior accounting 
performance (ROA and profit margin). Our results found in the cohort of large US firms that 
operate in many countries strengthens Scherer & Palazzo’s (2011) argument for that many 
private firms have started to assume social and political responsibilities that go beyond legal 
requirements.  
The interesting point in our findings is that CSR disclosure is not helpful for sale, it even 
tends to damage sale growth but still enhances firm's profitability (accounting performance). 
How could this happen? This can be explained by the fact that CSR engagement may not lead 
to sale growth but more benefits gained from the upstream activities of firm's supply chain 
than from its downstream. The gain from better output made by better staff or reduction of 
production and logistic costs may outweigh the possible negative counter effect of consumer 
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attitude toward firms' CSR engagement. Thus, we suggest that CSR should not be considered 
as the cost of doing business since disclosing CSR information is a good way to enhance 
financial performance. In brief, our findings support for Hong et al.'s (2016) claim that CSR 
activities are more likely to be beneficial to shareholders. CSR disclosure might create 
additional costs or a drop of sale due to consumers' negative attitude toward firm's CSR 
communication, but overall, it helps firms to improve their financial performance. Our 
findings suggest that CSR disclosure is not an efficient tool for sale promotion but an 
effective instrument for enhancement of firm's financial performance.  
Our paper offers three contributions to literature. First, we contribute to the theoretical debate 
about the costs and benefits of CSR engagement by providing evidence of positive effect 
between CSR disclosure and firm's performance while no effect on firm’s agency cost can be 
found. We suggest that CSR engagement was not an agency cost for shareholders but an 
investment for improvement of financial performance. Second, we extend the debate whether 
organizations should communicate about their CSR initiatives (Lindgreen and Swaen, 2009) 
by providing empirical evidence to support the view that communicating about social 
activities are beneficial to the communicating organisation. Although sale growth might slow 
down due to the possible scepticism and cynicism of consumers toward firm's CSR 
communication, overall this does not negatively affect firm financial performance. Third, to 
our best knowledge, this study is the first that has examined the influence of CSR disclosure 
on agency cost. Despite a good amount of research investigating the effect of CSR 
engagement on firm performance (e.g. Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001; Brown and Dacin, 1997), 
or the association of corporate governance instruments and agency cost (e.g. Rashid 2015, 
2016), there is hardly any study examining the impact of CSR disclosure on agency cost. 
There are some attempts to examine the cost of CSR, such as Sprinkle and Maines (2010) 
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conceptualise CSR cost as accounting cost, there is little empirical evidence about if CSR 
engagement associates with agency cost.  
For managerial implication, we recommend that a firm should engage in CSR activities and 
CSR communication. Consumers may be indifferent or even sceptical about the firm' CSR 
communication which may lead to zero or negative sale growth but this does not affect firm 
financial performance. Firms can be assured that CSR engagement enables them to improve 
financial performance, which is evidenced by our findings. We suggest that engagement in 
CSR activities for the sake of "window dressing" in the eyes of its customers does not help 
the firm to increase sale. We advise that a firm should not consider CSR as a sale promotion 
tool but a tool for efficiency improvement and therefore better financial performance. 
Efficiency improvement may arise from recruitment of good staff and cost saving in 
upstream supply chain activities such as logistics, procurement and production as a result of 
good CSR communication. We recommend that firm should disclose more information about 
its CSR activities as it seems that better information on environmental, social and governance 
aspects may enable firm to obtain higher financial performance. Our study has some 
limitations. We omitted some variables popularly used as control variables in corporate 
governance literature such as board interlocking, board diversity, ownership structure because 
of unavailability of the data. For financial performance, we only employed accounting 
performance indicators (ROE, ROA) and did not use Tobin’s Q to capture firm market value 
in stock markets as our primary focus is on firm performance in term of firm's profitability 
and not the firm investors' profitability. Additionally, the two-year period of study is not long 
enough to capture the panel effect of the dataset. We suggest future research overcome these 
weaknesses. Apart from these, future research can employ data of small firms and/or use the 
expense ratio and the ‘Q-free cash flow interaction’ to proxy for agency cost to see if the 
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Table 1: List of variables 
Variable  
type  
Variable name  Explanation  Adapted from  
Dependent  AUR  Agency cost is proxied by 
assets utilisation ratio (AUR). 
This ratio (annual turnover/ 
annual total assets, measured in 
million US dollars) shows a 
loss in revenue due to 
inefficient asset use; this 
variable is the proxy for agency 
cost.  
Ang et al. (2000); Singh and 
Davidson III (2003); Fleming 
et al. (2005); Florackis (2008); 
McKnight and Weir (2009); 
Henry (2010); Rashid (2015); 
Rashid (2016).  
sales_growth  sales growth  Greenley (1995).  




roa  Return on total assets  Rashid (2015); Rashid (2016).  
Key independent  csr_dislose  Disclosure score of 
environmental, social and  
governance information (0-
100)  
Aragón-Correa et al. (2016); 
Lai et al. (2016).  
Control  in_director  Singh and Davidson III (2003); Rashid  
 
Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
  Mean S.D. Min Max 1 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 VIF 
AUR .96 .81 .04 5.40 1.00 
        sales_growth 9.96 23.53 -82.13 431.45 .00 1.00 
       roe 18.30 30.56 -100.65 460.03 .04 .06 1.00 
      roa 6.15 6.41 -22.98 35.41 .17*** .12** .51*** 1.00 
     
29 
 
csr_disclose 26.48 14.09 8.77 73.68 -.13*** -.03 .09* .12** 1.00 
   
1.19 
in_director 81.98 12.63 .00 100.00 .01 -.07 .06 -.00 .23*** 1.00 
  
1.06 
leverage 4.03 1.45 -6.41 10.46 -.19*** -.06 .17*** -.28*** .10* .06 1.00 
 
1.04 





Table 3:  2SLS Regression Outputs using Instrument Variables 








 Coef P  Coef P  Coef P  Coef P  
csr_disclose -.000 .876 -.022  .735 .193
*
  P=.079 .068
***
 .000 
 (-.16)  (-.34)  (1.75)  (3.65)  
in_director .004 .144 -.104 .212 .136 .334 -.000 1.000 












 (-3.53)  (-2.53)  (3.08)  (-8.41)  
market_value -.263
***
 .000 .978 .136 1.840 .099 .298 .116 
 (-
11.68) 
 (1.49)  (1.65)  (1.57)  
employee_nu .000
***
 .000 -.000 .110 .000 .503 .000 .239 












 (11.91)  (1.87)  (-2.27)  (3.15)  
N  2125 2125 2125 2125 
R
2
 .234 .022 .050 .172 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < .05, 
**
 p < .01, 
***
 p < .001 
Model 1: csr_disclose is instrumented by social_disclose and gov_disclose. 
Model 2, 3 and 4: csr_disclose is instrumented by envi_disclose, social_dislose and gov_disclose. 
 
